The status gap that should not be a surprise
As of 5 March 2026, the Space Protocol to the Cape Town Convention has one contracting State — Paraguay — and four signatories: Burkina Faso, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe. It was opened for signature in Berlin on 9 March 2012 and is not in force. That is the finding of the UNIDROIT Secretariat’s own status report to the Governing Council (C.D. (107) 12, April 2026).
The MAC Protocol — the Mining, Agriculture and Construction Equipment Protocol — is not in force either. It has been signed by five countries and the European Union, and ratified by Paraguay (November 2024) and the Republic of the Congo (4 June 2026), according to the MAC Protocol overview maintained by its secretariat. Two ratifications is not broad adoption. Anyone who tells you the MAC Protocol has succeeded at scale is selling something.
But the comparison still matters, and not for the reason the headline suggests. The useful lesson is not that one treaty worked and the other failed. It is that the MAC Protocol’s preparatory commission did the institutional work before asking states to ratify, while the Space Protocol’s preparatory commission deferred the hard question to a sub-group. For a finance ministry in Nairobi, Abuja, Jakarta or Port of Spain deciding whether to spend political capital on ratification, that difference is the whole ballgame.
What the MAC Preparatory Commission actually built
The MAC Protocol was adopted at a Diplomatic Conference in Pretoria in November 2019. Its Preparatory Commission — a group of sixteen states including Nigeria, South Africa, the Republic of the Congo, The Gambia, Paraguay, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States — was given four core objectives required to bring the Protocol into force:
- Establishment of an International Registry;
- Preparation of Regulations for the International Registry;
- Designation of a Supervisory Authority for the International Registry;
- Ratification by five countries.
According to the MAC Protocol overview, the Preparatory Commission has already prepared draft registry regulations and designated a Supervisory Authority, and has almost finalised the process for establishing the International Registry. In other words, when a state ratifies the MAC Protocol, it is not joining a promise. It is joining a registry that exists, with rules that have been drafted and an authority that has been named.
That sequencing is the transferable institutional design. It front-loads the boring work — registry architecture, regulations, supervisory authority — so that ratification becomes a low-friction decision for a finance ministry rather than a leap of faith.
What the Space Protocol’s preparatory commission did instead
The Space Protocol also established a Preparatory Commission, pursuant to Resolution 1 of its 2012 Diplomatic Conference, to act as Provisional Supervisory Authority for the establishment of the International Registry for Space Assets. That is the same institutional template.
But in 2017, the Commission’s members agreed to shift the focus of its work and constitute a Sub-Group of experts to reassess industry participation for the promotion and development of the Space Protocol, which was considered a key factor in gaining support for the instrument. The 2026 Secretariat report records this without editorialising. Read it plainly: the demand-side question — will satellite operators and financiers actually use this registry? — was deferred to a sub-group rather than resolved through the construction of a working registry.
That is not a failure of the substantive law. The Space Protocol’s asset-based financing logic is sound in principle: an international interest in a satellite, registered internationally, enforceable across borders, lowers creditor risk and should lower financing costs. The problem is that a state considering ratification in 2026 is being asked to join a registry that does not yet exist, governed by a supervisory authority that is still provisional, on the strength of an industry-participation question that has been under review since 2017.
Why this matters from the Global South’s seat
Space agencies in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and small island developing states are not passive observers of this institutional design. They are the intended beneficiaries of the financing thesis, and they are the states whose ratification would bring the Space Protocol into force. The question they face is practical: does ratifying this instrument give our operators access to cheaper capital, or does it commit us to a legal framework whose registry and supervisory authority are still being built?
The MAC Protocol’s answer is instructive. Its Preparatory Commission included Nigeria, South Africa, the Republic of the Congo, The Gambia and Paraguay — a majority-Global South group alongside the larger economies. Those states did not wait for the registry to be built by someone else. They built it as a condition of asking others to ratify. The result is that Paraguay, which ratified the MAC Protocol in November 2024, and the Republic of the Congo, which followed in June 2026, joined an instrument with a functioning institutional core.
Paraguay’s dual ratification is worth noting precisely because it is not a strategy. The UNIDROIT Secretariat records that on 27 November 2024 Paraguay became the first contracting State to the Space Protocol and the first State to become a party to the Convention and all four Protocols, having ratified the Luxembourg Rail and MAC Protocols at the same time. That is a small state making a coherent decision across a family of instruments. It is not evidence that the Space Protocol’s design is working. It is evidence that one state found the package worth joining.
The sequencing lesson, stated plainly
The Space Protocol’s problem is not that asset-based financing is a bad idea. It is that the registry and enforcement machinery was designed before the industry it serves had matured into a predictable customer base, and the preparatory commission responded to that uncertainty by studying it rather than building through it.
The MAC Protocol’s preparatory commission did the opposite. It built the registry, drafted the regulations, designated the supervisory authority, and then asked states to ratify. The result is that ratification is a decision about whether to join a working system, not a decision about whether to bet on a future one.
For a regional body of African space agencies, or a group of Latin American or Southeast Asian agencies considering coordinated ratification, the practical implication is this: the first five ratifications are easier to secure if the registry already exists. A treaty waiting for its first five parties is a harder sell than a registry waiting for its first filing.
A hypothetical model, clearly labelled
The following is an institutional design proposal, not a reported development. No regional body has adopted it, and no agency has endorsed it.
A group of African space agencies — perhaps convened through the African Union’s space programme or a regional economic community — could issue a joint declaration of intent on the Space Protocol. The declaration would not commit any state to ratification. It would commit the group to three things: first, to jointly propose a shared supervisory authority arrangement for the International Registry for Space Assets, drawing on the MAC Protocol’s model of designating the authority before ratification; second, to commission a joint legal and financial assessment of how the Space Protocol’s international interest would interact with existing national secured-transactions regimes; and third, to coordinate the timing of ratification so that the entry-into-force threshold is met collectively rather than left to solitary states.
That model has a precedent in the MAC Preparatory Commission’s composition, which included Nigeria, South Africa, the Republic of the Congo and The Gambia. It does not have a precedent in the Space Protocol’s preparatory commission, which shifted to a sub-group of experts rather than a bloc of ratifying states.
What the ITU filing regime adds to the picture
Satellite financing does not happen in a legal vacuum. An operator’s ability to use a satellite depends on its access to orbital slots and spectrum, which is governed by the International Telecommunication Union’s Radio Regulations and its filing procedures. The ITU’s Space Network Systems database and the associated coordination processes determine whether a satellite can operate at a given orbital position without harmful interference.
For a creditor taking an international interest in a satellite, the ITU filing is part of the asset’s value. A satellite without a viable orbital slot and spectrum assignment is a satellite without a market. The Space Protocol’s registry design would need to account for that interaction — but the treaty text was not available for this analysis, and the UNIDROIT status reports do not address it. That is a gap worth flagging for any state considering ratification: the relationship between the Cape Town international interest and the ITU filing regime is not resolved in the documents currently available.
The honest bottom line
Neither protocol has demonstrated the financing-cost thesis at scale. The MAC Protocol has two ratifications and a registry that is almost finalised. The Space Protocol has one contracting State and a registry that is still provisional. The comparison is not about proven economic outcomes. It is about institutional design choices.
The MAC Protocol’s preparatory commission built the registry before asking for ratifications. The Space Protocol’s preparatory commission deferred the industry-participation question to a sub-group. For Global South agencies deciding whether to ratify, that difference is the lesson worth carrying into the next round of negotiations — not because the MAC Protocol has succeeded, but because its sequencing gives ratifying states something concrete to join.
FAQ
Is the Space Protocol in force?
No. As of 5 March 2026, it has one contracting State (Paraguay) and four signatories (Burkina Faso, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe), according to UNIDROIT document C.D. (107) 12.
Has the MAC Protocol entered into force?
No. It has been signed by five countries and the European Union, and ratified by Paraguay (November 2024) and the Republic of the Congo (4 June 2026), according to the MAC Protocol overview. The entry-into-force threshold is five ratifications.
What is the MAC Preparatory Commission?
A group of sixteen states established to bring the MAC Protocol into force. Its four core objectives are establishment of an International Registry, preparation of registry regulations, designation of a Supervisory Authority, and ratification by five countries.
Why did the Space Protocol’s preparatory commission change focus in 2017?
According to UNIDROIT document C.D. (107) 12, the Commission’s members agreed to shift focus and constitute a Sub-Group of experts to reassess industry participation, which was considered a key factor in gaining support for the instrument.
Does ratifying the Space Protocol give a state access to cheaper satellite financing?
That is the intended effect of the asset-based financing model, but it has not been demonstrated at scale. The Space Protocol is not in force, and no published assessment of its financing impact in ratifying states was available for this analysis.